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We associate the prose of John F. Avedon with the recent political history of Tibet, in
particular with the suffering and struggle of the Tibetan people within the polity of China
since 1950. Overall Avedon's account, published in Volume 7, Nos. 2/3 of The Himalayan
Research Bulletin, implies that the position of Tibetans is now extreme, as bad if not worse
than before the recent reforms of 1978 and 1980. In places he actually uses the language
of the holocaust, the words 'final solution,' to refer to current Chinese policies.
As a journalist, A vedon deals with issues and events significant today. His writing is
intended for a general audience, for whom the rhetorical presentation of a case is part of
the power-play and politics of popular debate. This is to a degree justified in order to
alert pressure groups or the public at large to the events or issues at hand. Here a point
is made, not perhaps because it is likely to be judged correct by the canons of science or
scholarship in the fullness of time, but because it represents the best guess, from a
particular standpoint, when a report or commentary was called for. Sometimes, when there
are applied as well as purely academic criteria, there are problems of accuracy.
In this
situation a person concerned with facts has to be careful, as it is a short-step from putting
something down because there is reasonable evidence that it is true, to putting it down
because it may be true and because it may be of help to what is seen as the case at hand.
I should be explicit on one point here. The historical record is clear that the Tibetan
people have suffered terribly since 1959, and that the Chinese have no more justification for
their actions there than did the European powers against black Africans or native Americans
in their own colonial actions since the 16th century. However, it is reasonably clear that
the material circumstances of Tibetans have improved quite significantly since the reforms
of 1980, if for no other reason than because they were so bad before. Moreover, I do not
think that the present fluctuations and inconsistencies in their policy to Tibet by China
merit the extreme accusations of A vedon.
This early history is known to some within the Chinese Central Communist Party, who
have made public statements to the same. It is also known to most of the readers of The
Himalayan Research Bulletin.
By and large, this readership has both the critical
sophistication,
and the particular cultural and historical knowledge, to point to the
inaccuracies of propaganda that are still presented by some in the Chinese Central
Communist Party. If anything, the readership of The Himalayan Research Bulletin is one of
the few categories of people whom one can be reasonably sure does not need propaganda to
draw its attention to the issue of Tibet. Yet The Himalayan Research Bulletin is unlikely to
be read by the public at large, nor is it likely to be read widely by those directly
concerned with policy decisions on Tibet; furthermore, Avedon's speech has already been
heard by the United States Senate. This raises the question of what, beyond an expression
of solidarity and concern among ourselves, is the effect of publishing it here?
The little collective power that academics have comes, perhaps, because we may be
thought of as objective experts. We look at events and information in their complexity, and
come up with something that we label 'the truth.' Such truths may use the same material
as journalism, but we question it in slightly different ways and with slightly different goals
to those of even a committed journalist.
It is reasonable to suppose that if an academic

journal has any wider political function at all, then it is to set the relative truth of the
facts on record as best it can, without either exclusion or exaggeration.
And this is the crux of the issue of John F. Avedon's presentation.
To publish such a
speech in a bulletin for scholarly exchange on research gives it a further legitimacy and
currency as 'the truth' in our sense, beyond the conventions of journalism. It might appear
unfair to the author to consider it by scholastic criteria: such standards would seem to
miss the main point, namely that it is a statement for the human rights of Tibetans rather
than an academic paper. Yet such points have to be made now, just because of the setting.
An academic bulletin, if it is to remain as such, should not be just swept along by events
and interpretations,
but has to examine issues by its own standards.
One has to be especially wary about crying out "woIL" If one does so too loosely,
then there is a danger of The Himalayan Research Bulletin (and its contributors) no longer
being taken at face value in serious circles. More importantly, to allow inaccuracies to be
put forward unchallenged in the name of academic research may not advance the cause of
Tibet. Even if a propaganda gain for Tibetan nationalism is the correct focus for this cause
at the moment, it might be very easy for such an advance to be turned around the other
way: a few exaggerations in Avedon's work could be pointed to in public, and then by
analogy the whole Tibetan case and authority of contributors to the Bulletin to comment on
them could be dismissed.
Ultimately,
the main issue is not of scholasticism but one of human rights, of
nationality bias and dominance of Han over Tibetan. A level statement of the facts as best
they can be known by our professional standards, that is informed public debate, is surely
the best way we can help this process.
Here there are perhaps three main areas for
comment and observation.
First, patterns of changes in regional demography, in effect
asking questions about immigration and resettlement by Han Chinese in traditionally Tibetan
areas: this is extremely important as such "facts on the ground" in the world of politics
constitute legitimation for fundamental changes. Secondly, examining discrimination and bias
in the exercise of political power, that is unequal national access to the new state apparatus
and the facilities and material benefits of the modern economy; these may be both
inequitable in themselves and set in process further structural differentiation
between the
groups. Thirdly, by looking at the acculturation that comes from modernity, and asking to
what degree this modernity unnecessarily bears a Chinese rather than a Tibetan stamp. In
addition, such academic work should unmask any false claims and errors of analysis, whether
these come from Chinese or Tibetan nationalist sources, or from other researchers and
scholars.1
What then is the evidence for Avedon's claims as to the 'final solution?' The image or
simile of Tibet as one huge prison-camp, one massive &.!!.illg or lager, may well be useful to
make outsiders comprehend some aspects of Tibet's recent history. The camps of Stalin's
Russia were in some ways remarkably similar to those of Hitler's Germany: one should not
suppose that those of China in the sixties were different in any fundamental form. Amdo,
or Qinghai as the Chinese know it, just happens to be where the Chinese center their own
&.!!.illg. As various survivors of gulags elsewhere, such as Solzhenitsyn and Primo Levi, have
recorded, one of the main effects of such concentration-camp
methods is to destroy the will
to protest, that is, it leaves individuals unable to do anything other than focus on immediate
animal survival.
Yet more than once recently, Tibetans have protested collectively in Lhasa against
Chinese rule. Whatever repressions and reprisals are taking place now, Tibetans are not

11 have commented on these general issues, and the collection of field data as they
effect China's published statistics, elsewhere.
Graham E. Clarke, "China's Reforms of
Tibet, and their Effects on Pastoralism," IDS Discussion P~1Per, No. 237, Nov. 1987).

suffering from extreme malnourishment
and starvation as did prisoners in the 'gulag
archipelago' of Stalin's Russia, and as many of them did prior to 1978 themselves. And it is
not the Tibetans who live in ghettos, but quite ironically it is the Chinese who, by and
large, live in cantonments.
Tibetans are not trucked and railroaded across Asia, gassed and
cremated, at rates of 5,000 a day, as were the Jewish people in Europe in the final years of
the Nazi Third Reich. While we do not have accurate figures on recent imprisonments,2
estimates of deaths, even from Tibetan nationalists, are far lower than those for recent
Palestinian deaths on the West Bank and Gaza strip.3
Tragically wrong, yes: but this is
not the 'Final Solution' as we may be made to think, and Avedon should not use phrases
quite so lightly that conjure up that extreme horror.
Overall, though A vedon normally purports to be describing the situation that has
resulted from the reforms of 1978 and 1980, his prose very much recalls the destitution
prior to 1978. In his account there is a great deal of this logical 'slippage' from events and
accounts before these dates, times which all admit were hellish, to the present-day.
This
tempts our sense of ou"trage and sadness to transfer from the one to the other, which in
turn obscures any objective consideration
of the record of recent changes, and any
reasonable debate on political and policy alternatives.

Much of A vedon's data and some of his interpretations of this recent period are either
inaccurate and of unsure provenance, or contain unwarranted assumptions and present a
partial picture. I am not going to go through all the factual errors, nor the uncertainties
of definition which dog the work throughout, but will treat some of the main points, such
as the historical record, the way he uses numbers, and general problems of interpretation of
data.
First, there is an error of sequence in A vedon's treatment of the history of events
leading up to Chinese reforms. He writes that China stopped its dialogue with Tibet as the
result of riots attendant on the visits of the Dalai Lama's delegations to Tibet, here
implying that this signified the beginning of a decline which has continued up until the
present day. This is wrong. Today the Dalai Lama, in letting it be known that he is
pursuing a 'Middle Way,' still clearly admits to lines of exchange and dialogue.
The clear historical sequence and obvious interpretation
is that the reports of these
visits of the Tibetan Government in Exiles' Delegations alerted Beijing to some of the
problems, and in part were responsible for the visit of officials of the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party to Tibet to investigate conditions in 'western areas' in 1980.4
The outcome of this last was the specific reforms for Tibet, Qinghai and Gansu of 1980 (as
distinct from the general pan-China post-1978 reform).5 As well as advocating economic
liberalization, these reforms proposed greater local autonomy, respect for local conditions,
the use of local personnel in administration,
and a restoration of local trade patterns.
The wisdom of the degree of autonomy intended there for Tibet was questioned in
China in late 1986, at the time of the replacement of Hu Yaobang from the position of
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General Secretary of the Chinese Communist party. Following this, the political reforms
that could have grown out of economic liberalization have been delayed or curtailed. There
have been violent and repressive police, and perhaps military, actions against Tibetans since
that time, especially in the capital. There is little information on whether there has been a
slowdown in the implementation of the reforms, or whether there have been alterations in
policies and plans at the economic and political levels.
Secondly, there are the numbers, statistics being very important in modern propaganda.
I am sometimes asked whether it is true or not that one million Tibetans have died at the
hand of the Chinese. I have tried to reply as follows: many Tibetans died from fighting,
from ill-treatment
in camps, or just from food shortages, from 1950 up until the late
cultural revolution in 1978; this figure of one million (or rather 1.2 million) is the figure
circulated by the Dalai Lama's sources. The original baseline figures are estimates from a
time when there were no modern census records, and the current figures for Tibet come
from Chinese statistics the absolute basis of which is unclear: the million is obtained by
subtracting the one from the other. Hence it is difficult to be sure. We could be talking
of less than half that figure; or we could be talking of half again as many.
I once asked another journalist, also weB-known for his publications on Tibet, how he
knew that around 6,000 monasteries had been destroyed in the cultural revolution, this being
the figure in general circulation.
For example, did the definition of monastery imply a
monastic complex, or separate temples and shrines; did it include the temples of household
monks and lineage priests (Tib. ser-khyim); what were the sources and records and were
there any assumptions in the calculation? The only answer I received was that this was the
generally accepted figure. In other words, this was a figure well-known for being wellknown repeated from one journalistic 'source' to another, rather than having any clear and
independent basis. Certain pieces of information, presumed to be hard data, if published
once gain a certain currency and are repeated endlessly.
Avedon's figures do not always clearly tally with other published primary records from
where they might be expected to derive. For example, in at least some Chinese sources
(e.g. People's Republic of China Yearbook, 1985), there are now fourteen autonomous Tibetan
prefectures.
Avedon refers to eleven, which at some time may have been the case: but he
gives us neither date nor source.
One suspects that numbers sometimes are given not
because the author knows them to be factually correct, but because such data is expected to
be found in a 'scientific' report (in the same way as in development reports), quite separate
from any possibility of finding out whether they are true or not. Such appearances of
numeracy are a part of the received culture of the twentieth century documentation.
This
is not to say that many of Avedon's figures are not 'right' in one way or another, but that
at the very least they require some source, caution and inte·rpretation.
For us to read that
"6,254 monasteries have been destroyed" is to lend a spurious air of empirical accuracy to
data that cannot be approached with such an unqualified air of precision.
This is especially so with demographic data. Here, just to follow what areas are being
referred to on a map one has to know the administrative and historical context. The years
1950 and 1959 are important, as since 1950 the eastern provinces of Tibet, Amdo and K ham,
which are wealthy regions containing just over half the Tibetan nation, have by and large
been subsumed in the provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Szechuan and Yunnan. Here the Tibetan
people form small minorities (no more than 19.36%, in the case of Qinghai; otherwise below
2% of the total provinces, 1982 Sample Survey of China Census Figures).
Since they came under Chinese administration in 1959, the central and western areas
have been administratively
separate. This central/western
area alone is known as Tibet (or
the Tibetan Autonomous Region) within the polity of China. Whereas the eastern areas have
just over 2,000,000 Tibetans, this western/central
residue named 'Tibet' is recorded as
having a little under 2,000,000 inhabitants.
Tibet is the Q!llv. Minority Nationality Area
recorded in which the minority is actually in the majority; they are the only Minority

Nationality with more nationals immediately outside of their nationality area than inside.
Those who keep the records often have the power to write their own history, to make their
own demographic fictions into self -fulfilling prophecies: China has done much here to slide
the label Tibet onto the smaller western/central
area, and to make a minority out of a
nation.
A vedon, however, confuses rather than corrects the errors from these statistical
manipulations.
He gives a figure of some 2,000,000 Han Chinese and 1,800,000 Tibetans in
the Tibetan Autonomous Region, that is the truncated Tibet which is the western/central
area. This is a major error that may have lead him into further mistakes. According to
A vedon's own figures there are only 250,000 people in the towns of Tibet, so where would
the other 1,750,000 Han Chinese be? He has little alternative, perhaps, but to write that all
medium-sized villages have an equal number of Han Chinese and Tibetans; one would have to
suppose that most villages in Tibet had to be medium-sized to accommodate the numbers,
though we are not told what this expression 'medium-sized village' means. He also argues
that Han Chinese are displacing Tibetans from their villages, forcing the Tibetans to become
nomads. In both of these two arguments he slips over from his figures on 'what the PRC
itself labels Tibet,' that is the western/central
area, to writing of Tibet in general, that is
including Kham and Amdo in the east. This leaves it unclear as to quite which region he is
writing about.
At least as far as the western/central
(Tibetan Autonomous) region is concerned the
figures A vedon cites are nonsense.
Outside of Lhasa and Shigatse and the military
garrisons, as nearly any traveller in 1986 or 1987 can confirm, one has to search for Han
Chinese personnel even if one wants to find them. My observation is that such civil
personnel were often not present below prefecture level, and that the county level
representatives were usually Tibetan.6 Otherwise most Han Chinese presence is limited to
sporadic line-ministry offices, not to the management of daily governance at a grass-roots
level. As Avedon notes elsewhere, by and large the Han Chinese do not enjoy life on the
Tibetan plateau, and do not wish to settle there. The demographic truth of the non-Tibetan
presence has to be closer to the official Chinese figures, which is around 106,000 (1982), or
76,000 (1984), that is 5% of Avedon's total.7
Dharamsala makes a claim similar to A vedon's in their figures in a broadsheet entitled
'Approximate Population Figures for Tibet, 1987.' This gives a total population of 3,870,000
for the Tibetan Autonomous Region, with 1,890,000 Tibetan nationals. This would leave a
balance of 1, 980,000 and the broadsheet states that 1,720,000 are Chinese, which roughly
tallies with the totals. These are not claimed as independent figures but come from Chinese
sources, in particular from the 1982 census, which is the only published source of which I
am aware that allows an ethnic or nationality breakdown.
This census does give a total
number of 3,870,000: but this is for Tibetan nationals in the Chinese polity as a whole, with

6The shang, (or xiang) for which the normal gloss is township, is a peoples'
organization,
but it is not one in which the state administrative
apparatus is directly
represented.
It is a "bottom-up" organization of local government that in Tibet is composed
of six neighborhoods or village-communities,
which elect the officers. It has little power at
present, and the Chinese civil administrative
presence is mainly focused at the 'county'
(cheuh) or sub-county offices. The separation of such local government from administration
or ministry activity is a the heart of the post-1978 Chinese reforms.
7This excludes military personnel for whom estimates by Tibetan nationals vary from
100,000 to 500,000 at different times.
We do not know whether this definition of
residence includes paramilitary personnel and temporary workers.

1,890,000, being the number of people resident in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, of whom
1,787,000 are Tibetan nationals.
This suggests that there has been a misreading.
One way or another, it seems that
the figure for the total number of Tibetans in the Chinese polity has been taken as the
total population for all groups in the Tibetan Autonomous Region; this has been put
alongside the commonly-read
figure for the number of Tibetan nationals in the Tibetan
Autonomous Region. The difference between the two generates nearly 2,000,000 extra Han
Chinese, all imaginary, in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. This is quite enough to populate
each and every village all over again with a ghostly Ban doppelganger for every single
Tibetan!
The real issue on migration and settlement by Han Chinese is not the Tibetan
Autonomous Region but the eastern areas. However, it is not possible to clearly desegregate
the statistics for those regions, beyond those stated for Qinghai. And here there are also
some discrepancies between Avedon's data and that of the 1982 Sample Census. Whereas the
latter gives the population of Qinghai (most of Amdo) as 3,895,000 Han and other Chinese to
754,200 Tibetans, Avedon gives 2,500,000 to 700,000 (year and source unspecified).
The
Chinese figures would actually be more telling to illustrate numerical dominance than those
of A vedon himself; and if this really were a historical series there would be clear evidence
of modern settlement.
In any case, whether the ration is 5.7 to I, or 3.6 to I, Tibetans are clearly
outnumbered in Amdo. What does this imply? One simply cannot assume, as Avedon does,
that all non-Tibetan peoples present here are Chinese migrants from after 1950. First, the
ethnic picture in the convoluted mountain regions of south and east Kham (Yunnan and
Szechuan) traditionally is every bit as complex as that in the Himalayan chain itself (where
one has Tibetans at one altitude, 'tribals' at another, and Hindus below, on each and every
mountain slope).8 Second, both the Tibetan polity, and the Chinese polity, have had
histories of cultural and political influence in these areas.9 Third, the idea of clearly
demarcated borders within which only one nationality resides and one polity exerts authority
is a relatively modern idea. Spiritual and political authority were not always bounded in
Cartesian space, nor was religious power always subservient to secular power in traditional
Asiatic States. Accordingly, the question of whether or not these present-day borderbnds
really were a part of traditional Tibet or China may simply be inappropriate.
Similarly the presence of 'Chinese Muslims' in Tibet is not a modern phenomenon.
This has been documented since the time of the Jesuit missionaries in the area, and unless
A vedon is referring to something far more sinister than these restaurateurs of Lhasa, this is
not evidence of a new wave of Chinese settlement in Central Tibet. Yet there has been
Han immigration in modern times into the eastern areas, especially from central Szechuan;
but we do not know the figure. Also, urban growth in the east (as in other areas), is quite
disproportionately
linked to Han Chinese settlement. Beyond the figures for Amdo, there is
little firm quantitative data available.
In Avedon's account this settlement is presumed to be such that Tibetans have been
made 'landless' in the process, and forced into 'nomadism'. Here his argument goes slightly
awry, as the normal western senses and implications of these two terms are not appropriate
in Tibet.
In development terminology 'landlessness' is normally associated with rural
poverty. This is especially so in areas of high population density, where the wealthy and

8The wntlOgs of various travellers, from Rock onwards, and other sources such as
the Journal of the West-China Border Research Society, give clear evidence of this.
9Jackson's
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privileged force subsistence farmers off the land and replace them with capital machinery
for intensive crop production to maximize returns from sales in markets. Yet Tibet has a
quite particular agricultural economy, in part based on nomadic pastoralism and in part on
crops, but in both cases based on rights to land being held in common by extended
household or kinship, and village or neighborhood, groups. Furthermore, the population
densities in western and central Tibet are low by any standards, and possession of land for
agricultural subsistence is not the issue. Access to new 'inputs,' especially fertilizer and
the location of new irrigation works, would be more critical points to examine if one wishes
to look at equality of distribution rather than landholding itself. Above the treeline in
purely pastoral areas, this notion of private landownership becomes irrelevant.
Here the
western ideal or model of the small homestead on its own private range-land is quite
inappropriate.
Collective rights, common property, resource management are the norm.
Furthermore, 'nomadism,' which in popular western thought stands for a more 'primitive'
way of life than that of a farmer, in Tibet implies a pastoral way of life particularly valued
by those who practice it. 'At the moment, many Tibetans would not prefer a sedentary way
of life.
Moreover, there is an irony in the fact that these supposedly impoverished pastoral
nomads, with their large herds of livestock, are one of the principal groups to benefit from
China's introduction of a market economy.
The declared value of the Gross Value of
Agricultural Output per capita for some rural areas of Tibet, at 500 to 600 yuan per head, is
well ahead of the overall Chinese average (276 yuan per head). My own work indicates that
an average 'tent-holding'
of livestock has a value well into five figures in yuan, which
means one is rich by Chinese standards. This can be turned into cash as butter or beef on
the open ('outside') market, as the pastoralists are now linked by road to the markets in
Lhasa. The existence of such material wealth is also the general observation made by
modern travellers (including Tibetans revisiting the area) on conditions in pastoral areas of
Amdo. This opening up of Tibet to' trade is a result of the general economic reforms in
China introduced in 1978, and implemented in Tibet in 1980.
One comment A vedon makes is that recent economic changes have lead to a massive
general inflation in the price of commodities. This is accurate. However Avedon, unlike an
economist, does not interpret this as a predictable effect of the deregulation of the market
in what prior to 1980 was still run as a centralized 'command' economy. Instead he sees it
as another attack on Tibetans, now forced to pay more for basic commodities.
But many
Tibetans do not rely on open-markets such as those of Lhasa for their commodities, but still
subsist mainly on local production backed by some access to regulated and subsidized state
outlets for basic commodities (where the "inside" price is 50% of the "outside" or market
price). A vedon does not describe how inflation has benefited the many Tibetans who now
are producing for the market, such as the producers and dealers in wool, those who truck-in
butter from Amdo or who sell meat in Lhasa, and the local itinerant peddlers. It is not
only the Chinese producers of manufactured goods (which in relative and historical terms
are luxuries rather than basic commodities), who have gained from the creation of openmarkets.
In economic terms inflation is both cost and benefit; it is important to remember that
it discriminates not, at least not directly, against Tibetans per se, but by economic criteria.
It can work against people on the fringes of what was a subsistence economy who have to
sell their labor to purchase essential commodities in a newly-formed
market economy; it
often works for those who produce agricultural surpluses for sale in the market. The state
marketing in commodities was and is subsidized and the existence of open markets beyond
direct central control has lead to a growth in production beyond the level required to fulfill
the quotas of the state (though these in principle are now voluntary).
In simple terms,
much of the extra money from the rise in prices has gone to those who produce, and many
of these are Tibetans. The state marketing policy of China has materially profited Tibetan

pastoralist; hence economic exchange between the nationalities in China is not just a
question of one-sided exploitation.
There may (now) be rich Tibetans as wel1 as poor Tibetans.
Socio-economic
polarization is perhaps predictable in these conditions, and is something about which the
socialists (especiaHy hardline Maoists) are quite critical. Whether, for example, the number
of Tibetan destitute or poor in Amdo has increased or decreased since the instigation of
economic markets and the reforms is a pertinent question; but it is not one that Avedon
considers.
He does consider access to modern social services, especial1y to education and health
care. He correctly points to the absence of health facilities outside of the few urban areas,
where there are a high concentration of Chinese. He also suggests a nationality bias in
treatment for Han Chinese beyond this. The absence of health facilities outside of urban
areas and district headquarters is suggested both by direct observation, and by a careful
reading of Chinese statistics. But then the provision of health services to nomads, given
their transhumance and low population density, is difficult anywhere in the world, as much
in the Sahel as in Tibet. The overal1low population density raises conventional distribution
costs of goods and services astronomical1y for rural areas, and the availability of these is
almost by definition associated with urbanization.
Such modern urban growth has been
carried out by Chinese.
One simple corol1ary is that because of where they live Han
Chinese wil1 have better access to hospital facilities. Furthermore, within these catchment
areas the status, power, and connections of the Han Chinese may give them disproportionate
access to scarce medical resources, but then so do these factors in most countries, except in
a purely socialist world.
Beyond this urban Chinese localization of facilities, there is one other clear medical
issue. A vedon al1eges that there is routine infanticide of Tibetan babies. When I read
these reports of A vedon's in Nepal in 1987, I put them to a Tibetan nurse who had then
only recently arrived from Tibet. She was completely literate in Chinese, had been educated
in Chamdo and Chengdu, and had worked in hospitals in Chamdo and Lhasa; but she had no
love for China's presence in Tibet and eventual1y had left for India and Nepal. Her opinion
was as foHows. First, a pregnant single woman, Tibetan or Chinese, might be put under
pressure to have an abortion. Second, couples in towns are encouraged to have only two
children, beyond this number they would probably be put under pressure to have an
abortion; it might also be the case that when born, if there was a compel1ing reason, a
second or third child might be fostered elsewhere.
This would be in-line with China's
general demographic policy for 'single-child' families, the local implementation of which may
not take account of the special legal exemptions that exist for minority peoples.
This nurse volunteered that any such cases would be extremely rare, and specifical1y
ruled out the idea that Chinese hospitals were routinely kil1ing-off Tibetan babies. I believe
that she was taken aback by my question; while it is not impossible that she was naive or
misinformed,
I would be extremely surprised if she were that wrong. She displayed no
reticence whatsoever in being critical of Chinese in Tibet, and I think she was in a prime
position to comment on such matters with authority.
Furthermore Avedon's logic, if we
look at it more closely, contains certain contradictions.
It is difficult to see how he can
point to the absence of practical1y any general health facilities, and then at the same time
claim that a program of racial infanticide and sterilization is being carried out at large on
the Tibetan population.
Moreover, it is quite clearly those Tibetans who work with the
Chinese in towns who have access to medical facilities.
This means it would be the
supporters of the Chinese whose children were being killed. Discriminating against those
who cooperate with one is not a credible way of ruling.
Many of the same points about distribution apply as much to education as wel1 as to
health. There are some special features, for instance, the primary language of instruction,
Mandarin, must favor the Han nationality students. The medium of instruction is an almost

insoluble problem with an ethnic minority in a modernizing state, one which bears as much
on cultural issues as on problems of equity and dominance. Perfection would exist only if
higher education were available in the minority language; yet it would be difficult to justify
using scarce linguistic talent to translate scientific texts into the 54 minority languages; and
at a high level of study in China, like anywhere else in the world, a student has to look at
works in languages other than that of his own country (notably English) if he wishes to
keep abreast of scientific research.
The basic dilemma is as follows: either there will be a promotion of studies in Tibetan
which, it is reasonable to suppose, will attract more Tibetans than Han Chinese; in this case
the point can be made, as by A vedon, that they are being disproportionately
excluded from
higher modern knowledge which is only available in Chinese; or one does not have Tibetan
studies, in which case the point could be made that the Chinese are not maintaining local
cultural knowledge and traditions. The Chinese who released the data on the large number
of Tibetans taking higher education in Tibetan Studies probably never thought that it could
be used to show anything other than a liberal and enlightened policy of its administration in
Tibet.
.
Religious practice is even more immediately concerned with Tibetan traditions and
national culture than education. There are contradictions here too. Avedon states that the
recent rebuilding of monasteries and temples is from local investment. Outside of the few
towns this revival has little to do with the state; yet in the towns, in Shigatse and at other
major centers, the work is far too massive to be paid for privately out of Tibet's fledgling
market-economy.
The recent Chinese record in such material matters is good indeed, and
central subsidies cover much of the massive construction at Tashilunpo.
The standard of
execution of the masonry work is excellent, though the wood is unseasoned and the standard
of artwork leaves a lot to be desired in comparison to that of Tibetan artists in Nepal.
Avedon is undoubtedly right in stating that it is the Chinese intention to restore only major
sites, and that tourism is the overt economic justification:
so it is with the preservation of
many monuments in London. At least they are rebuilding rather than knocking down, and
though it is ultimately a material rather than a spiritual statement, this has surely been a
step in the right direction.
Possibly the Chinese public at large, by virtue of this work, will one day realize, that
the Tibetans really do or did have a civilization.
Avedon is correct to draw attention to
the Chinese antipathy towards organized religion, that is not under the direct control of the
state, and the pressure against monastic recruitment.
But then, the Catholic church has a
similar problem with its community in China, and it is not clear to what degree the present
Chinese attitude is just anti-religious, or anti-tradition, or contains specifically anti- Tibetan
components.
Whether general or particular to Tibet, the contradiction between materialism and
religion is a key issue. For many in the West, the central significance of Tibet is not that
its people should have access to industrial goods and services, but something quite different.
Tibet stands as a symbol of a pre-industrial
and spiritual life, a culture centered on
Buddhism.
It is the Chinese attitude to this, rather than the issues of equity and
development that are at the center of this protest and their idea of Tibet. Yet the cant of
'superstition' is not merely the call of present-day China to Tibetan civilization, but that of
the modern to the medieval world-view. Avedon does not place China's action and attitudes
within the general context of a modern materialism, which is almost always antithetical to
spiritual values, but that of differences of nationality, people, and material expropriation.
For example, while he deals with the history of removal of statues from Tibet to China
during the cultural revolution, he does not deal with the alleged reports of the role of
Tibetans in some of the destruction at that time, which might suggest that China's
oppression of Tibet is not solely a matter of anti-Tibetan
policies.
The Sino-Tibetan

conflict, which correlates with this division, masks these contradictions behind the issue of
independence and nationalism.
Hence, beyond his factual errors, A vedon makes further mistakes in analysis. He does
not distinguish
nationality biases in policy from other current factors, such as the
urban/rural divide, population density, and wealth; nor does he take account of the way that
the cumulative history of interaction of these factors may be responsible for the pattern of
present-day
inequities.
In the broad sweep of life these criticisms may appear to be
technicalities:
after all these points are to a degree correlated, and may to some degree be
constitutive of the other. But this criticism is more than a scholarly nit-picking:
it is only
by disentangling these factors from the statistics that we can see if there is a particular
current nationality policy bias, distinct from other factors which are the result of earlier
processes and patterns, that is from events preceding 1980. With the best will in the world
the effects of these past decisions and processes cannot be changed overnight.
This is
especially true in sectors with as much lead time as education, and in areas where the
topographical uniqueness of Tibet itself forms a constraint.
To simplify the picture for the western/central
area, the Chinese are in the towns
where there are services; the Tibetans are in the countryside where there are few services.
It would only be by changing the demographic facts in the few towns, that is by moving
Chinese out and Tibetans in, that the effects of past policies could be fully reversed, and
this is not possible overnight. Even if one could do so immediately, this might work against
the growth of modern technical and administrative services for economic development.,
Ironically, pursuing such a path would be an act similar to the 'leftist' policies of China
during the cultural revolution, which placed the correct class background of people in
power, that is the 'relations of production,' above the ability of those people to carry out
the technical work, only this time this "reverse discrimination" would be revamped in terms
of nationalities rather than class structures.
If the provision of modern economic goods and services to Tibetans at large is the
issue, than one has to consider the 'efficiency' or 'rightist' argument.
This is that the
short-to-medium
term needs are for greater numbers of outsiders with special skills for
organization, teaching and general development; not the immediate repatriation of those who
have this experience.
Moreover, it would be the conventional logic of any development
service, be this aid offered by westerners in a third-world country or that by the Chinese
in Tibet, that one can only attract personnel with specialist skills if they and their families
can be offered living conditions that compare with those that they would receive at home.
This implies the continuation of a rural/urban bias correlated to the Tibetan/Han nationality
distinction, at least in the short-term, if one wants to modernize. That is unless the entire
Western-educated
Tibetan diaspora returns home.
Tourism, which A vedon clearly sees as a mixed benefit, is directly pertinent here. The
point is that modern goods and facilities cannot be available everywhere immediately, but
have to be organized and supplied. There is a clear contradiction in having foreigners (in
this context very much fellow-travellers of the Han Chinese having highly privileged access
to these scarce goods) complain that Tibetans are excluded.
A similar situation exists in other Asian countries where there are many foreign
tourists and experts, not to mention the southeast Asian countries which have known a
Western colonial presence or recent military protection.
It is simple to pass a moral
judgement on the Han Chinese measured against some absolute ideal. This is unfair, given
the direction of policy changes since 1980; it is also short-sighted.
One has also to ask in
what ways does the situation of the visiting Westerners, in terms of their privileged access
to resources and services, differ to that of the Chinese, other Asian elites, or their colonial
precursors. Does ethnicity, insensitive colonial-style behavior, a past history of oppression,
or the suspected permanent nature of the presence, make a basic difference or not? And if
these material changes are now inevitable, then one has to ask in what ways now are the

Chinese better or worse than any other power that is introducing the rather mixed benefits
of the industrial revolution to a traditional Asian state?
Overall, A vedon's account is only accurate on the historical facts of oppression from
China to Tibet since 1950 up to the present decade. Many of those events and processes
have a carryover into the present period. But his work does not allow us to see in what
ways and how much the situation has been changing as a result of the implementation of
the 1978 and 1980 reforms. Instead there are some major statistical errors, a slippage of
logic into propaganda, the avoidance of some basic parallels, wider contradictions,
and a
carryover of the same oppressive metaphors.
It is clear that there have been recent improvements, at least by Western material
economic standards. Since the liberal reforms which promote economic growth started to
take hold, Tibetans have had access to the 50,000 km of road that have run across (greater)
Tibet for reasons of rule for some time now. They can use buses, and even own trucks;
those from the west and center can visit Lhasa for trade at least once a year. There is
geographic mobility, and a growing market economy, both in local items and in modern
commodities that either'are Chinese, or that come via China.
From 1983 up until 1987 it appears that regional autonomy, and access to material
goods and some services, was improving as a direct result of policy reforms. From research
in the summer of 1986, while these qualitative trends were clear, it was not possible to say
whether such changes had effected 30% or 80% of the population in these western/central
areas (Clarke, 1987, loc.cit.). Lhasa and its environs may well have been atypical.
Yet
post-1980 one has to allow that some parts of the Chinese administration were trying, in
some limited ways at least, for some part of the time, to materially help the cause of
Tibetans.

To value the separate civilization of Tibet and Tibetan autonomy, and at the same time
to hold that modern material goods and services are absent in Tibet because they are
deliberately withheld by the Chinese, is an all too convenient belief. It hides a more basic
contradiction between materialism and spirituality, one which cannot be fully encompassed
within nationality issues.
In the political alliance of progressive and traditional camps in the West against
oppression in Tibet, it has been forgotten that these two normally make rather uneasy
bedfellows.
Furthermore,
the actions of indigenous people who choose to embrace
materialism may not be too different from those of equally materialistic colonizers.
Whatever their route of entry, by indigenous elites or external colonists, individualism and
material consumerism rarely support a traditional civilization. Even Tibetan autonomy might
not be any guarantee of the maintenance of Tibetan civilization.
We may have to realize that whatever the future of Tibet, traditional Tibetan culture
may soon exist not so much in a lived society as in the marginal lands of the Himalaya, and
the records collected by people such as those who contribute to this Bulletin. Whether the
political future of Tibet is an issue for The Himalayan Research Bulletin is a difficult
question, and I have suggested that the answer is yes, but is so then only by our own
professional standards of accuracy and analysis.
Up until this decade modern Tibet was very much a closed book. Now, after the
reforms of 1978 and 1980, there are some changes, both internally in Tibet and by which
outsiders can see what is happening. One of the contradictions of the present liberalization
is that for the first time it places the media in a position to communicate scenes of
oppression.
This it does irrespective of its overall significance or even the fact that its
very possibility belies an improvement.
The persistence of and dominance of the idea of
oppression in this decade, which the media itself helps to maintain, is only a part truth, as

life is now materially easier for Tibetans in Tibet. This idea also serves, to a point, as a
psychological convenience.
Factions and differences can be ignored, as the common cause
unites Tibetans in opposition to China, onto whom all the material evils of the twentieth
century may be projected and, hopefully, cast-out, like a scapegoat.
An independent Tibet is the hope and slogan of Tibetan nationalists.
Yet a political
scientist or modern historian could not fail to point out that the independent nation-state,
whatever its symbolic significance, is not a reality in the latter part of the twentieth
century.
Superpowers change the picture. For example, Poland and Czechoslovakia are
independent of Russia, and Panama and Mexico are independent of the USA. To what
extent can such nominal independence be a core issue, given a world of political 'satellites,'
'spheres of interest,' and global economic integration.
To use the slogan of independence
for political leverage is one thing; to envisage it as a feasible future is quite another.
Before stating that Tibetans do not need any help, and that China should just leave Tibet
alone, one would do as well to be pragmatic. The four to five million Tibetans have nearly
one thousand million Han Chinese neighbors, to whom in the modern, even more than in the
preindustrial world, they inescapably will have economic and political linkages. To assume
that Tibet could revert to itspre-1950
theocratic form, and then swallow industrial
modernization whole without disruption, is naive and in the extreme.
The possibilities for constructive economic and social change are not clear, given an
area with such cultural, demographic and topographical peculiarities as Tibet. It would be
fascinating to speculate on how the local cultural and ecological parameters of Tibet could
forge some new turning of the wheel, some new dialectical inversion, for a post-industrial
society. This may be a romanticism, moreover, one to which Western Tibetophiles and
anthropologists may be particularly susceptible: but it is not quite as naive as the wish to
recreate the past.'
Yet whatever modernizing dialectic has to be worked out, it must take account of two
factors. First, the geopolitics of economic relations mean that this dialectic must involve
China as well as Tibet. Secondly, for it to work equitably it must involve all Tibetan
groups; indeed, for it to work properly, Tibet needs the return of Tibetan nationals in the
West, who are the one group with the technical and managerial knowledge, the commitment
and the vision, capable of forging a new and modern Tibet that still has a chance of
remaining in essence Tibetan.

